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7	Bowen	
8	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
9	COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA	
1011	MARK CHRISTOPHER TRACY, an individual,	Case No. 23CV423435
12 13	Plaintiff,	REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SPECIALLY APPEARING DEFENDANT GARY BOWEN'S MOTION
14	v.	TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF
15	COHNE KINGHORN, PC, a Utah professional corporation; SIMPLIFI COMPANY, a Utah	PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS FOR INCONVENIENT FORUM
16	corporation; JEREMY RAND COOK, a Utah resident; ERIC HAWKES, a Utah resident;	Date: January 11, 2024
17	JENNIFER HAWKES, a Utah resident; MICHAEL SCOTT HUGHES, a Utah resident;	Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept: 6
18	DAVID BRADFORD, a Utah resident; KEM CROSBY GARDNER, a Utah resident;	Judge: The Honorable Evette D. Pennypacker
19	WALTER J. PLUMB, a Utah resident; DAVID BENNION, a Utah resident; R. STEVE	
20	CREAMER, a Utah resident; PAUL BROWN, a Utah resident; and GARY BOWEN, a Utah	
21 22	resident,	
23	Defendants.	
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Specially appearing defendant Gary Bowen ("Bowen") submits this Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Specially Appearing Defendant Gary Bowen's Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss for Inconvenient Forum (the "Motion").

I. INTRODUCTION

In his Memorandum and Points of Authority in Support of Opposition to Defendant Bowen's Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss for Inconvenient Forum (the "Opposition"), plaintiff Mark Christopher Tracy ("Plaintiff") does not provide any evidence or make any arguments as to why this Court has jurisdiction over Bowen. Instead, Plaintiff argues that the Motion should be denied based on two technical grounds. First, Plaintiff argues that the Motion is without evidentiary support because Bowen failed to execute his declaration under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the State of California. Second, Plaintiff argues that the Motion should be denied because the hearing was not held within 30 days pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 418.10(b). Neither of these arguments have any merit.

The instant action is, in fact, nothing more than Plaintiff's continued obsession with harassing defendants over the development of a relatively small residential neighborhood and a public drinking water system in Emigration Canyon, Utah over 25 years ago. Complaint, ¶ 37. Plaintiff does not live in Emigration Canyon and does not own any real estate in Emigration Canyon, so it is unclear why Plaintiff has harbored a decade long obsession with bringing frivolous litigation against anyone that has ever had any association with Emigration Improvement District or development in Emigration Canyon. However, what is clear is that there is no merit to his claims, and certainly no basis for Plaintiff to bring an action against defendants in California. In paragraph

61 of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that "[t]he above-listed allegations were filed in United States Federal District Court of Utah on September 26, 2014, under the False Claims Act (the "FCA Litigation")." See USA ex rel Mark Christopher Tracy v. Emigration Improvement District, et al., 2:14-cv-00701. In other words, almost all the substantive allegations in the Complaint are just a recital of allegations and issues that Plaintiff has alleged in previous litigation in Utah. On October 29, 2021, the Utah Federal District Cout Judge Parrish issued an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Cost and Granting Defendants' Motion to Amend in the FCA Litigation (the "FCA Attorney Fee Order"). Id., Docket No. 342. In the FCA Attorney Fee Order, Judge Parrish found: "Thus, having found that Tracy's actions were both clearly vexatious and brought for the purpose of harassment, the court need not reach the question of whether Tracy's claim was clearly frivolous." Based on the finding, Judge Parrish awarded defendants \$92,665 in attorneys' fees and costs for expenses against Plaintiff, none of which have been paid. Plaintiff has also been deemed a vexatious litigant by Utah state courts based on his frivolous and vexatious actions against defendants in Utah state court.

II. ARGUMENT

A. Any Defect in the Bowen Declaration Does Not Justify Denial of the Motion.

Plaintiff first argues that that the Motion is without evidentiary support because Bowen failed to execute his declaration under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the State of California. Bowen, however, filed an Amended Declaration which was identical to his original declaration, but which was under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the State of California. Thus, any defect was corrected and does not serve as a basis to deny the motion.

Moreover, even if the original Bowen Declaration was defective, when a defendant moves to quash service of process based on lack of personal jurisdiction, "[t]he plaintiff has the initial

burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction." *Pavlovich v. Superior Court* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 273 (Pavlovich); *Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc.* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 449 (Vons). Only when a plaintiff carries that burden does it then shift to the defendant to demonstrate that the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over it would be unfair or unreasonable. (*Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); *Vons*, supra, at pp. 447-448.).

Plaintiff has failed to articulate any facts that would justify the exercise of jurisdiction.

Plaintiff acknowledges in his Complaint that Mr. Bowen is a resident of Utah, and Plaintiff's sole allegations against Bowen are that Bowen sent an email to Utah local press and an email to Deputy Utah State Engineer Boyd Clayton in November 2018 (Complaint, ¶¶ 19, 74 and 75). Plaintiff does not even attempt to argue in his Opposition how these facts support jurisdiction, and Plaintiff does not make any substantive arguments in his Opposition in response to the Motion.

Finally, Bowen moved to quash for both lack of jurisdiction under California Code of Civil Procedure § 418.10(a)(1) and inconvenient forum under California Code of Civil Procedure § 418.10(a)(2). As Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint, all of the general allegations in this Complaint were also included in a False Claim Act case that Plaintiff previously filed against almost the identical defendants in the United States Federal District Court for the District of Utah. Complaint ¶ 61; see also USA ex rel Mark Christopher Tracy v. Emigration Improvement District, et al., 2:14-cv-00701. All of the general allegations relate solely to Emigration Canyon in Utah and issues related to development in Emigration Canyon, and the allegations have been repeated by Mr. Tracy in multiple lawsuits in Utah that have been found to be frivolous, vexatious and harassing. Plaintiff failed to make any argument in response to Bowen's motion to quash for inconvenient forum, which is not contingent upon the Bowen Declaration and serves as an alternative ground for

the Court to grant the Motion.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's contention that the Court should deny the Motion based on an alleged defect in the Bowen Declaration is without merit.

B. California Court's Do Not Require a Hearing Within 30 Days.

Plaintiff's only other argument is that the Motion should be denied because the hearing was not held within 30 days pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 418.10(b). However, despite the statute's use of the word "shall," courts have not construed Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (b), to impose a mandatory requirement that a hearing be noticed or held within 30 days.

In *Olinick v. BMG Entertainment* (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1286 (Olinick), for instance, the defendant filed the notice of its motion to stay or dismiss based on inconvenient forum, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (a), on May 4, 2004. (*Olinick*, supra, at p. 1295.) It then designated a hearing date of July 1, and the parties later stipulated to move the date to July 21, which the trial court approved. (*Ibid.*) The Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiff's arguments that a mandatory 30-day timeline governs the motion and that "by failing to designate a hearing date within the 30-day period, [defendant] waived its right to bring the motion under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 418.10." (*Id.* at p. 1296.)

The Court of Appeal noted that subdivision (a) of the statute provides that "`[a] defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion . . . " (*Olinick*, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1296, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a).) It explained that, "the statute reflects the trial court is authorized to extend the time for filing such a motion" (*Olinick*, supra, at p. 1296), and cited with approval treatise language stating that "`[s]cheduling a hearing date beyond 30 days

should not invalidate a motion to quash. Nothing in [Code of Civil Procedure section] 418.10 suggests the court must overlook the lack of personal jurisdiction or proper service because of a defendant's failure to schedule a hearing date within 30 days." (*Ibid., quoting Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial* (The Rutter Group 2005) ¶ 3:381.) The court therefore rejected the argument that a "tardy hearing date on a motion to stay or dismiss under section 418.10 deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of the motion." (*Olinick*, supra, at p. 1296.)

Similarly, in *Preciado v. Freightliner Custom Chassis Corp.* (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 964, the Court of Appeal rejected the same argument in the context of a motion to quash that was noticed for hearing 99 days after filing because that was the first available court date. (*Id.* at p. 972.) *Citing Olinick*, the court held that "'a tardy hearing date on a motion . . . under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 418.10' does not 'deprive[] the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of the motion." (*Id.* at p. 969, fn. 4, *quoting Olinick, supra*, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1296; *Edmon & Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial* (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶ 3:381 ["scheduling a hearing date beyond 30 days does not invalidate the motion"].).

In this case, the Court noticed the hearing at the first available date. Clearly, a defendant cannot be subject to jurisdiction of the Court simply because the earliest available hearing date was more than 30 days out.

CONCLUSION

This Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Bowen, and any of the other defendants, because all the individual Defendants are residents of Utah and both entities are Utah corporations without offices or a presence in California. Further, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants arise from alleged conduct occurring exclusively in Utah with no connection to California. Accordingly, the Court should quash

1 **PROOF OF SERVICE** 2 Tracy v. Cohne Kinghorn, et al., Santa Clara County Superior Court Case No. 23CV423435 3 I, Sarah Nguyen, state: My business address is 1 Post Street, Suite 2500, San Francisco, CA 4 94104. I am employed in the City and County of San Francisco where this service occurs or mailing occurred. The envelope or package was placed in the mail at San Francisco, California. I 5 am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action. On January 4, 2024, I served the following documents described as: 6 REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SPECIALLY APPEARING DEFENDANT 7 GARY BOWEN'S MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 8 INCONVENIENT FORUM 9 on the following person(s) in this action addressed as follows: 10 Mark Christopher Tracy Nicholas C. Larson 1130 Wall Street, # 561 Miguel E. Mendez-Pintado 11 La Jolla, CA 92037 **Autumn Ross** Email: m.tracy@echo-association.com MURPHY PEARSON BRADLEY & FEENEY 12 Email: mark.tracy72@gmail.com 520 Pike Street, Suite 1205 Seattle, WA 98101 13 NLarson@MPBF.com 14 mmendezpintado@mpbf.com ARoss@mpbf.com 15 Attorneys for Defendant PAUL BROWN 16 BY FIRST CLASS MAIL: I am readily familiar with my firm's practice for X 17 collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service, to-wit, that correspondence will be deposited with the United States Postal 18 Service this same day in the ordinary course of business. I sealed said envelope and placed it for collection and mailing on January 4, 2024, following ordinary business 19 practices. 20 BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties X 21 to accept service by electronic transmission on January 4, 2024, I caused the documents to be sent to the person(s) at the electronic notification address(es) listed 22 above. Within a reasonable time, the transmission was reported as complete and without error. 23 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the 24 foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed this date at San Francisco, California. 25 Dated: January 4, 2024 26 27 28 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF SPECIALLY APPEARING DEFENDANT GARY BOWEN'S MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT FOR

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